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Accounting for the Importance of
Nonfarm Income on Farm Family
Income Inequality in New York
Richard N. Boisvert and Christine Ranney
As the proportion of farm family income due to nonfarm sources continues to grow
nationally, it is important to understand how farm families in various regions or states are
affected. This paper develops a better understanding of the contribution of income from
nonfarm sources to the level and distribution of income among farm families in New York.
In analyzing income distribution, the Gini ratio is decomposed to determine the effects of
marginal changes in income by source to overall inequality. The results are compared with the
simulated changes in income inequality due to changes in income by source as measured by
an “adjusted” Gini ratio which accounts specifically for negative farm incomes. Differences
in the policy implications from both procedures are compared. The relationships among
sources of income and policy implications can be brought into sharper focus by examining
both measures
Nonfarm sectors of the rural economy are inextri-
cably tied to agriculture through input and output
markets and as a source of employment for dis-
placed agricultural labor. Families remaining in ag-
riculture also depend increasingly on nonfarm
sources of income. Nationally, about one-third of
farm family income was from nonfarm sources in
the 1950s; about 6070 of farm family income now
comes from nonfarm sources. Incomes of farm
families rose from 50% to 80% of that of the non-
farm population between the 1950s and the 1980s
(U.S. Department of Agriculture 1986; Johnson,
Hemmi, and Lardinois).
Increased reliance on nonfarm income has been
one way for many farm families to participate in
the nation’s overall economic growth, but for oth-
ers, it may be necessary to offset recent financial
problems in production agriculture, In addition to
closing the gap between incomes in the farm and
nonfarm sectors, nonfartn employment may affect
the overall income inequality within the farm sector
itself. The effects will differ regionally as well as
by state (Findeis and Reddy).
The purpose of this paper is to examine the im-
portance of income from nonfarm sources to farm
families in New York, particularly in terms of its
effect on income inequality. The analysis focuses
on 1985 and 1986, the first two years in which
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nonfarm income information was collected as part
of the Cornell University farm management records
system. Special attention is given to two major
subgroups of the sample—those with nonfarm
sources of income and those without.
Although it is impossible to summarize all the
important features of an income distribution in a
single statistic, the Gini ratio continues to be a
useful initial indicator of underlying changes in
income dispersion. Our ability to understand the
contribution of individual components of income
to total income inequality has been enhanced re-
cently by Pyatt, Chen, and Fei, and Lerman and
Yitzhaki in their decomposition of the Gini ratio.
Despite the advantages afforded by the decom-
position, comparisons of inequality remain difficult
when, as is the case in today’s agriculture, farm
incomes can be negative in a given year. The prob-
lemsarisebecausethe Giniratio isno longerbounded
between zero and unity. In some past studies, neg-
ative incomes were set to zero, recognizing that
inequality may be underestimated (Ahearn, John-
son, and Strickland; Kinsey; Carlin and Reinsel).
The magnitude of the underestimate is an empirical
question,
More recently, Chen, Tsaur, and Hai (1982) have
proposed an “adjusted” Gini ratio that is bounded
between zero and unity when some incomes are
negative. This is a distinct advantage in comparing
ratios of inequality over time or across populations.
Unfortunately, this “adjusted” Gini ratio cannot2 April 1990 NJARE
be mathematically decomposed by income source.
The important methodological question is whether
the advantages afforded by this adjustment in mak-
ing comparisons across populations are sufficient
to justify its use. As it turns out, the two years for
which New York farm income data are available
are quite appropriate for such an analysis. In rel-
ative terms, 1986 was a better year for New York
agriculture than was 1985. Thus, the incidence and
severity of negative net farm incomes are quite
different between the two years. This is exactly
what is needed to understand how the adjusted mea-
sure of inequality differs from the conventional
measure.
The remainder of the paper begins with a short
discussion on inequality measurement; a reiteration
of the decomposition properties of the Gini mea-
sure; a presentation of the “adjusted” Gini ratio;
and a description of a procedure for simulating the
decomposition of the “adjusted” ratios. This is
followed by a description of the data and the em-
pirical results from decomposing New York farm
family income using both the conventional and
<‘adjusted” Gini measures. A comparison of the
differential policy implications to be derived from
the two decomposition procedures is then followed
by a statement of the paper’s major conclusions.
Measuring Inequality
The Gini ratio, usually defined as the ratio of the
area between the Lorenz curve and the 45° line
(which represents the fraction of total income pos-
sessed by the holders of the smallest pth fraction
of income) and the area under a 45° line (Gast-
wirth), is one of the most widely used measures
of inequality. As such, it has also been the subject
of much criticism, the most serious being that for
income distributions with the same mean, it is im-
possible to find an additive social-welfare function
that ranks distributions by their Gini ratios (Chip-
man). This type of criticism can be levelled at most
rankings based on only two parameters of the dis-
tribution and at a theoretical level; what is needed
is a multivariate measure that accounts for the het-
erogeneity y of contemporary populations.
Despite this criticism, Lerman and Yitzhaki and
others argue that the Gini ratio remains an impor-
tant tool for examining income distribution be-
cause: (a) Gini’s mean difference and the mean
permit one to form the necessary conditions for
stochastic dominance of income distributions; (b) an
extended Gini index can be used to reflect increas-
ing social aversion to inequality in much the same
way as Atkinson’s index of inequality; and (c) the
Gini ratio can be decomposed, thus isolating each
source’s contribution to inequality and the marginal
change in income by source on overall inequality.
This latter point is particularly attractive because
despite one’s inability to find additive social wel-
fare functions consistent with a‘ ‘mean-Gini” rank-
ing, more general multivariate formulations still
lead to social-welfare functions whose partial de-
rivatives are positive with respect to the mean and
negative with respect to the Gini (Cumming, cited
in Chipman). Thus, ceteris paribus, changes in a
Gini ratio due to marginal changes in income by
source can be interpreted unambiguously.
Gini Ratio ad Its Decomposition
Lerman and Yitzhaki demonstrate that the Gini ra-
tio can also be derived directly from the formula
for Gini’s mean difference:
(1) A = ;F(Y) [1 – F(Y)]dY,
a
where Y is income (a < Y < b) and F(Y) is the
cumulative distribution, Through integrationby parts
and variable transformations, they show that
(2) A = 2 COVIY, F’(Y)].
The Gini ratio (G) is then formed by dividing A
by mean income (KY).
Letting YI, . . . , Y~be components of income
such that Y = X Y~, and using the properties of
k
the covariance of the sum of random variables
(Mood, Graybill, and Bees):
(3) A = 2 ~ COV(Y/,, ~(y,)).
k
Dividing (3) by KYand multiplying and dividing
each component by cov(yk, F(Y~)) and ~k yields
the Gini decomposition on total income:
(4) G = ~ [cov(yk, ~(y))/cov(yk, ~(yk))]
“ [h)v(yk, F(Yk))//Jk] . [pJpy]
= ~ &@&k,
k
where Rk is the correlation between yk and the
cumulative distribution of Y, Gk is the Gini ratio
for Yk,and Skis Yk’sshare of l’. Pyatt et al. prove
that – 1 < Rk ~ 1, and Rk takes on its extreme
values when an income source is a decreasing ( – 1)
or increasing (+ 1) function of total income and is
zero if yk is a constant.
To determine the change in inequality due to a
marginal change in yk, Lerman and Yitzhaki, and
Stark, Taylor, and Yitzhaki consider a change inBoisvert and Ranney
each person’s income from source k equal to e~Y~
where ek is close to 1. Then,
(5) %lde~ = Sk(R~G~– G), and
(6) [dGlde#G = [S~G,&~G] – S,.
These elasticities in (6) sum to zero because a pro-
portional increase in income from all sources would
leave income inequality unaffected.
Adjustments for Negative Incomes
Gastwirth shows that the Gini ratio is still defined
when some incomes are negative but mean income
remains positive. Then, the bounds on the Gini
ratio range from O~ G < (~ - a)(b – K)/u(b”
– a), where a and b are defined by equation (1).
The situation arises because when there are nega-
tive incomes, the Lorenz curve does not cross the
horizontal axis (Figure 1) until negative incomes
have been balanced by positive incomes (Chen et
al, 1982), Therefore, instead of the Gini ratio being
defined by the area B divided by B + C (as in the
case where no incomes are negative), it is now the
area A + B divided by B + C. The area A -t- B
now has no maximum size, implying that the Gini
ratio may now be greater than unity and overesti-
mate income inequality.
The magnitude of the overestimate is an empir-
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ical question and will certainly vary from appli-
cation to application. One strategy that has been
used to facilitate comparisons across distributions
with negative incomes is to set the negative ob-
servations to zero and recalculate the Gini ratios
(Ahearn et al.). The one advantage of this strategy
is that it preserves the decomposition properties,
but unfortunately, there is no way of knowing
whether this procedure has over- or undercompen-
sated for the overestimate mentioned in the para-
graph above. The effect may differ significantly
across applications and may be particularly im-
portant when a large proportion of incomes are
negative.
Alternatively, Chen et al. (1982) propose a nor-
malization of the Gini ratio. This “adjusted” Gini
ratio, G*, is derived by writing the conventional
Gini ratio in terms of the mean difference. Let ~




Then, the income share of the j’!’ family can be
written as




(10) G = l/n ~ ~ y~(2j - (n + l)).
j=l i<j
To examine the range in G, define m so that
~ yj = Oand rewrite (10):
j=l
(11) G = 1 + (2/n),~l jyj
— (l/n) j=~+, y~ [1 + 2(n - j)].
Written in this way, it is apparent that with
yj; O, then G ~ 1 depends on
(12) (2/n) ~ jyJ ~ (l/n) ~ yJ (1
j=1 j=m+l
+ 2(n – j)).
A natural adjustment to G is to divide (11) by one
plus the left side of (12):
[
(13) G* = 1 + (2/n) ~$1jyJ4 April 1990 NJARE
n 1




1 + (2/rz)~$1jyj ,
which equals G if all y~>0 since the left side of
(12) vanishes. Chen et al. (1982) also show that
as all income is concentrated in one family, G* =
O,and as n--+~, G*~ 1.Thus, G* ranges between
zero and unity as does G.
Chen et al.’s (1982) geometric interpretation
provides the best intuitive explanation of the ad-
justment implied by G*. As stated above, with
negative incomes, G = (A + B)/(B + C), and it
can be meater than one because the area above the
Lorenz&rve and the 45° line has no upper bounds
on its size. To compensate, the adjustment adds
the area above the Lorenz curve but below the
horizontal axis (A) to the denominator of the ratio
(e.g., G* = (A + B)/(A + B + C). It is readily
apparent that the adjustment reestablishes an upper
bound of unitv on G*.
From a computational point of view, it is nec-
essary to identifythe subsetof families(when ranked
in ascending order by income) whose combined
.
incomes equal zero (e.g., ~ y~ = O), but this sit-
;=1
uation would be unlikely to occur in empirical data.
A more likely situation is where this sum of in-
comes over the first m families is negative and the
first m + 1families is positive. To account for the
fact that the Lorenz curve crosses the horizontal
axis in this case between them and m + 1families,
Berrebi and Silber show that the “adjusted” Gini
should be calculated as
[
(14) G* = (2/n) ~ jyJ – (n + l/rz) j=l 1
[
1 + 21n ~ jyJ
,~yi ‘=’ _,
+ l/n: yJ+– (1 + 2nz)
j=I Y 1
1+2(A– C) — —
(1+ 2A) ‘
The major advantage of the “adjusted” Gini
measure is that it retains the properties and geo-
metric interpretation of the con-ventionalGini. -Un-
fortunately, it cannot be decomposed by income
source, and it is not possible to develop analytical
expressions for the elasticities of the ;‘adjusted”
Ciini ratio by income source comparable to those
for the conventional Gini (e.g., equations (5) and
(6)). To circumvent this problem, the changes in
the ‘iadjusted” Gini ratio due to a marginal change
in a particular source of income can be simulated
using a simple procedure. The first step in the pro-
cedure is to calculate several additional “adjusted”
Gini ratios, each after one particular source of in-
come had been changed (ceteris paribus) uniformly
by 1% for each family, This change in income is
added to total income before a new “adjusted”
Gini ratio is calculated. The elasticity representing
the change in inequality due to an increase in in-
come by source is then calculated by subtracting
the new “adjusted” ratio from the original “ad-
justed” ratio and dividing by the original “ad-
justed” ratio. This simulation strategy assumes the
same type of change in income that is embodied
in equations (5) and (6). However, the sum of the
elasticities in the simulations will not add to zero
because it was necessary to do the simulations us-
ing finite changes in income by source.
An Application to New York Dairy Farms
For many policy purposes it is desirable to analyze
national farm-level data, which include the distri-
bution of income by source, and examine regional
differences (Ahearn et al.; Findeis and Reddy).
During the current financial crisis in agriculture,
New York and possibly other states have begun to
ask for more information as part of their farm rec-
ord programs. For example, 1985 was the first year
that Cornell collected information on nonfarm in-
come, assets, and liabilities as part of the Dairy
Farm Business Project. Because participation in the
project is voluntary and most participants are pri-
marily dairy producers, these farms are not a rep-
resentativesampleof all farms in the state. However,
in 1986, farm marketing of dairy products were
about 60’% of all New York farm cash receipts
(New York Agricultural Statistical Service), and
about 65% of New York’s commercial farms sold
dairy products (U.S. Department of Commerce).
Thus, these data provide a preliminary indication
of the contribution of income from different sources
to farm family income inequality among commer-
cial farms in New York. Further, by analyzing data
for 1985and 1986, the implications for farm family
income inequality under different conditions in the
agricultural sector are examined. For agriculture in
New York, 1985 was not a particularly good year,
but 1986 was somewhat better.
Table 1 includes descriptive information regard-
ing the income of New York dairy farm families
by source. The subgroups delineated in the tableBoisvert and Ranney Accountingfor the impor~anceof NonfarrnIncome 5
Table 1. Average Income of New York Dairy Farm Families by Source
Negative Incomes Set to Zero’
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20 18 0 0
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Source: Calculated from data on farms cooperating in the dairy farm business summary project, Department of Agricultural
Economics, Cornell University. Detail may not add due to rounding.
‘The only negative income component is net farm income, If net farm income is negative for a given family, it is set to zero
and total family income is recalculated.
are important because about 6090 and 4590 of the
sample farms in 1985 and 1986, respectively, had
no nonfarm income; changes in net agricultural
income, rural labor markets, and government pay-
ments may affect family incomes on farms with
and without nonfarm income differently.
In 1985, average farm family income for partic-
ipating farms was $25,634, For those with no non-
farm income, the average was $27,666, and for
thosewith nonfarm incomethe averagewas $22,937.
In 1986, average farm family income was $29,572,
or 15%higher than in 1985. For the two subgroups,
those with no nonfarrn income and those with non-
farm income, family incomes were $30,815 and
$28,480, respectively. For the state sample, net
farm income (defined as the return to operator and
unpaid family labor, management, and equity) con-
stituted 7570 of farm family income in 1985 and
71% in 1986. Nonfarm income was just over 15%
of family income in the statewide sample for both
years, but within the subgroup where a family
member works off the farm, nonfat-mincome rep-
resented about 40% of family income in 1985 and
34% in 1986.1 Direct government payments were
about 10%of 1985family income for both groups.2
‘ In fillingout the farmbusiness smnrnary,individualswereinstmcted
toreportthe totalofnonfsrnrworkforselfandspouse, gifts, inheritances,
tax refunds, and other nonfamrincome. Althoughdata on the proportion
of nonfarrnincome by category are not available, those in charge of the
surveybelieve that most nonfarmincomereportedis fromnonfarmjobs.
2Thedwt governmentpaymentsexcludethe indhectpaymentstlrrough
the dairy support program. In the initial stages of this researeh, we tried
to use existing estimates of free-market milk prices to isolate the size of
this subsidy and add it to direct government payments, However, the
sizesofthese subsidiesappearedunrealisticallyhighandimpliednegative
farmincomes forthe vast majorityof farms, Thus, they seemedto reflect
morea short-termprice changerather than a price that wouldk obtained
after any structural adjustment would occur. We elected not to incor-
porate these estimates into the analysis in this paper.6 April 1990
For 1986, such payments were 10% of family in-
come for those without nonfarrn income and 15%
of family income for those with nonfarm income.
To help evaluate strategies for dealing with nega-
tive incomes, Table 1 also reports the average in-
comes by source when calculated with negative
incomes set to zero.
Evaluation of Negative Income Adjustments
Tables 2 and 3 contain three separate decomposi-
tions of inequality by source. The first decompo-
sition ignores the potential problems arising from
negative incomes and applies the decomposition
outlined in equations (1) through (6). The second
applies the same decomposition after setting all
negative incomes to zero and recalculating farm
family incomes. The third utilizes the “adjusted”
Gini coefficient (equation (14)) to account for neg-
ative incomes; the decomposition is based on sim-
ulated changes in income rather than derived
analytically. These methods are evaluated both in
terms of the reasonableness of the results and their
usefulness for policy analysis.
NJARE
To assess the different methods for measuring
inequality when components to family income are
negative, it is useful to focus initially on the results
for 1985. In this year, about 26% of the farm fam-
ilies in the sample had negative net farm incomes;
nearly 18% of them had negative family incomes
(Table 1). In 1986, just under 22% of the farmers
in the sample had negative net farm incomes, but
the magnitude of the losses was much smaller. On
only about 13% of the farms were there negative
family incomes. Interestingly, in both years a larger
proportion of families with some nonfarm income
had negative farm incomes than did those families
with no sources of off-farm income; the proportion
of these families with negative family incomes was
about the same as for the families with no nonfarm
income in 1985 and substantially lower in 1986.
The significance of these relatively larger pro-
portions of negative farm incomes in measuring
inequality is reflected in the various Gini ratios
reported in Tables 2 and 3. In comparing the con-
ventional Gini ratios of total income with those for
which negative farm incomes are set to zero, it is
clear that such a procedure can lead to a serious
Table 2. Three Alternative Decompositions of Farm Family Inequality on New York Dairy
Farms, 1985
Farms Without Farms With
All f%rms Nonfarm Income Nonfamr Income
Gini of Gini of Gini of
Source Elasticity Source Elasticity Source Elasticity
Income G, of Total Gk of Total Gk of Total














































































Source: Calculated from data on farms cooperating in the dairy farm business summary project, Department of Agricultural
Economics, Cornell University.
Note: Gkis defined by equations (1) through (4). The numbers in parentheses below the conventional Gini ratios by source are
(R,) from equation (4), the correlation with the rankof total income. The elasticity by source is from(6), except for the ‘‘adjusted”
Gini in which case incomes by source were increased by 1% ceteris paribus, and added to total income, The “adjusted” Gini
ratio for total income was then recalculated to identify the percentage change in inequality. The “adjusted” Gini comes from
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Table 3. Three Alternative Decompositions of Farm Family Inequality on New York Dairy
Farms. 1986
Farms Without Farms With
All Fartns Nonfarrn Income Nonfarrn Income
Gini of Gini of Gini of
Source Elasticity Source Elasticity Source Elasticity
Income of Total of Total of Total
Decomposition Source (2) Inequality (::) Inequality (%) Inequality
Conventional Farm 0.865 0.212 0.685 0.035 1.136 0.386
(0.899) (0.984) (0.839)
Gov. 0.809 –0.062 0,842 –0.035 0.779 –0.091
(0.346) (0.473) (0.266)
Nonfarrn 0.778 –0,150 0.583 –0.295
(0.113) (O.126)
Total 0.598 0.650 0.544
Negative income Farm 0.600 0.071 0.582 0.018 0.605 0.104
components Gov 0.809 –0.014 0.842 –0.018 0.779 –0.002
set to zero Nonfarrn 0.778 –0.057 0.583 –0.102
Total 0.482 0.560 0.406
‘‘Adjusted” Farm 0.758 0.188 0.659 0.032 0.843 0.338
Gini Gov. 0.809 –0.051 0.842 –0.016 0.779 – 0.075
Nonfarm 0.778 –0.120 0.583 –0.263
Total 0.584 0.632 0.533
Source: Calculated from data on farms cooperating in the dairy farm business summary project, Department of Agricultural
Economics, Cornell University.
Note: Gkis defined by equations (1) through (4). The numbers in parentheses below the conventional Gini ratios by source are
(Rk)from equation (4), the correlationwith the rank of total income. The elasticity by sourceis from (6), except for the’ ‘adjusted”
Gini in which case incomes by source were increased by 1’7.ceteris paribus, and added to total irreome. The “adjusted” Gini
ratio for total income was then recalculated to identify the percentage change in inequality, The “adjusted” Gini comes from
equation (14),
underestimate of inequality. For all farms in 1985,
the conventional ratio for total income was 449Z0
above the ratio calculated assuming all negative
incomes were zero. The difference was even more
dramatic (55%) for the subsample of farms that
reported some nonfarm income. The differences
are still substantial, but less dramatic, in 1986. (In
all cases, these Gini ratios are above the “ad-
justed” ratios, suggesting that setting negative in-
comes to zero overcompensates for the upward
“bias” in the conventional Gini ratios when neg-
ative incomes are present. )
In both years, the differential results for this
sample of New York dairy farms are more pro-
nounced than those discussed by Ahearu et al. For
their work at the national level, negative farm in-
comes in one part of the agricultural economy are
likely to be offset by higher returns in other sectors
of agriculture. Thus, even though the size of the
differential might vary by application, it is prob-
ably safe to conclude that setting negative income
components to zero would always be more prob-
lematic at the regional or state level.
A comparison between the conventional Gini ra-
tios and the “adjusted” Gini ratios is not as
straightforward (Table 4). If one is only concerned
about inequality in total income, the two measures
yield remarkably consistent results across years and
groups of farms. For 1985, the conventional ratio
is consistently 89Z0above the “adjusted” ratio; it
is 2% above the “adjusted” ratio for 1986. How-
ever, this consistency disappears once attention is
focused on the individual sources of income. Since
neither government payments nor nonfarm incomes
are negative, the respective conventional and “ad-
justed” Gini ratios for these income sources are
identical. Differences appear only in the two ratios
for farm income. For farms without nonfarm in-
come in 1986, the conventional Gini measure was
only about 4% higher than its “adjusted” measure.
This is in contrast to the 61% difference for families
with nonfarm income in 1985. The larger differ-
ences between the two measures in 1985 are ob-
viouslyexplainedby the higher incidenceof negative
farm incomes in that year.
Although differences in the two types of Gini
ratios are important in comparisons of inequality
across groups, it is the elasticities of income by
source which have the most direct implications for
policy. Despite the fact that only one of the three
Gini ratios by source is affected by the “adjust-
ment” in equation (13), all the elasticities of in-8 April 1990 NJ.4RE
Table 4. Comparison of Elasticities of Total Family Income Inequality by Income Source
Using the Conventional and “Adjusted” Gini Measures of Inequality
Ratios of Elasticities of Total
Ratio of Conventional Family Income Inequality by
Gini to “Adjusted” Ginia Income Source (Conventional/’‘Adjusted”)
Groups Total Income Farm Income Farm Gov Nonfarm
AHfarms
1985 1.083 1,237 1.469 1.380 1.317
1986 1.024 1.141 1.128 1.216 1.250
Farms without nonfarm income
1985 1.081 1,119 1.305 1.750 —
1986 1.028 1.039 1.094 2.188
Farms with nonfarm income
1985 1.083 1,611 1.467 1.518
1986
1.468
1.021 1.348 1.142 1.213 1.122
Source: Calculated from data in Tables 2 and 3.
“This ratio isunityforgovernmentpaymentsandnonfarmincomebecausetherearenonegativeincomesforthesetwocomponents,
equality in total income by source are affected. The
corresponding elasticities retain the same sign, but
the elasticities based on the conventional Gini are
always higher in absolute value. Thus, in quali-
tative terms, the policy implications to be drawn
from an examination of the elasticities of total fam-
ily income from marginal changes in income by
source are the same, whether they are derived an-
alytically from the decomposition of the conven-
tional Gini ratio or simulated from the calculations
of the “adjusted” Gini ratio. However, the “bias”
to the conventional elasticities for the “all farm”
sample and for those farms with no nonfartn in-
come is larger than the bias exhibited in the Gini
measures themselves; exactly the opposite is true
for the sample of farms with some nonfarm income.
A couple of conclusions are apparent from this
analysis. First, there seems to be little reason to
set negative income components to zero in empir-
ical work. The “adjusted” Gini ratios can be com-
pared directly across populations or time as a single
relative measure of inequality. On this basis alone,
it is probably the preferred measure. At a theoret-
ical level, however, welfare comparisons are easier
to infer from the conventional Gini because the
partial derivative of important classes of general
social-welfare functions is negative with respect to
the conventional Gini. The conventional Gini has
the advantage that the elasticities by income source
can be derived analytically. The elasticities based
on the “adjusted” Gini are not as analytically con-
sistent because of the need to use finite changes in
income in the simulations, but they suggest that
the elasticitiesderived analytically are biased. These
biases are particularly problematic because they are
not necessarily of the same relative magnitudes as
the Gini coefficients themselves. Therefore, in sit-
uations where there are a significant number of
negative incomes, it would seem advisable to cal-
culate both measures and their corresponding elas-
ticities before developing policy conclusions. An
understanding of how the various sources of in-
come interact analytically is best obtained through
an examination of the three components of equation
(4). However, the absolute magnitude of the effects
of policy are perhaps estimated more realistically
through the simulated elasticities derived from the
“adjusted” Gini.
Policy Implications of the Inequality
Decomposition
The policy implications of the analysis are derived
from both an examination of the measures of in-
equality, as well as the elasticities of inequality by
source. Since the elasticities of inequality indicate
the effects on family income inequality from a mar-
ginal change in a particular income source, the
policy implications are derived in turn through the
effects policy changes would have on each source
of income.
With regard to the inequality measures them-
selves, it is clear from Tables 2 and 3 that with
only a couple of exceptions, farm incomes are more
unequally distributed than are either government
payments or nonfarm income. However, when added
together, the three sources of income generate a
distribution of total family income that is less un-
equal than any of the individual sources. From a
rural development perspective, an important im-Boiwert and Ranney Accounting for the ImportanceofNonfarmIncome 9
plication of this result is that off-farm job oppor-
tunities for members of farm families have not only
increased average family incomes, they have also
reduced the income inequality among families.
To obtain a better understanding of why this
happens, recall from equation (4) that the share of
total income inequality due to a given source de-
pends on the income share (Sk) and the Gini of
source (G~), as well as where the recipients of
different income sources are in the total income
distribution (IQ. The values of Rk in Tables 2 and
3 reflect the correlations between each source of
income and total income; high positive values of
Rk, ceteris paribus, imply that income source k
contributes importantly to total income inequality.
For both years, the differences in these correlations
across sources are striking. For farm income, the
correlations are 0,8 or above, while for the other
two sources, the correlations range between 0,1
and 0.5. With one exception, the 1985 subgroup
of farms with nonfarm income, Rk is higher for
government payments than for nonfarm income.
Government payments on dairy farms in New York
are more equally distributed across families than
is net farm income.
Our understanding of the composition of in-
equality can be pushed one step further by exam-
ining the elasticity of total inequality due to a small
change in income from a given source. These elas-
ticities are also shown in Tables 2 and 3. Although
these elasticities assume that all individuals’ in-
comes from that source are increased proportion-
ately, they do provide an initial indication of how
changes in rural economic conditions and public
policies affecting income by source are translated
into the effects on income inequality.
To illustrate, there are a number of public pol-
icies that can directly or indirectly affect farm prof-
itability y. In a state like New York, past increases
and current reductions in the milk support prices
are an important source of change in net farm in-
come. More indirectly, changes in feed-grain pro-
grams that affect livestock feed prices are reflected
in net farm income through changes in feed costs.
Changes in interest or farm wage rates resulting
from changing economic conditions or changes in
farm credit policy are reflected in net farm income
in a similar fashion. Any of these changes that
would give rise to a 190increase in farm profita-
bility would also increase the disparity in total farm
family income for the state as a whole by from
between 0.15 and 0.19 (as measured by the “ad-
justed” elasticity of farm income) of 1% in the two
years, The effect would be quite different by
subgroup. For those without nonfarm income, the
increase in inequality would be less than 0,10 of
170, while for the second subgroup it would be
between 0.27 and 0.34 of 1%.
However, in evaluating these elasticities, it is
imt)ortant to remember that such a change in farm .
income would require differential initial changes
in the individual cost or revenue components. For
example, in both years, feed and labor expenses
are only one-fourth and one-ninth, respectively, as
large as milk sales. Thus, to effect the same per-
centage change in farm income, feed and labor
costs would have to fall by 4 and 9 times, respec-
tively, as much as milk prices would have to in-
crease. The initial change in interest rates would
have to be much larger still because interest costs
are a relatively small fraction of total costs. These
impacts are only marginally different between the
subgroups.
Ignoring their indirect effects through feed prices,
changes in farm programs, such as the feed-grain
program, that would lead to an increase in direct
government payments would reduce income in-
equality. The small correlation between direct gov-
ernment payments and total income is explained
by the fact that dairy farms in New York are not
major participants in feed-grain or other farm pro-
grams where direct government payments are made.
The situation might be much different if it were
possible to estimate the indirect government pay-
ments associated with dairy price supports, subtract
them from farm receipts, and include them in this
government payments category. If this were done,
the incidence of negative farm incomes would rise
and the differential policy implications implied by
the conventional and’ ‘adjusted” Gini ratios would
clearly be increased.
Changes in economic conditions in the nonfarm
economy can also be evaluated in terms of their
effects on farm family income inequality. As an
illustration, consider a general increase in wage
rates in rural nonfarm labor markets. Initially, one
might expect these wage rates to be reflected in the
incomes of those currently working off the farm.
The corresponding initial impact on farm families
would be to reduce income inequality. The “ad-
justed” elasticities for the statewide sample (– 0.10
and – 0.12 in 1985 and 1986, respectively) would
be reasonable estimates of the percentage reduction
in income inequality. These elasticities presume
that there is no increase in the mo~ortion of families
participating in off-farm emp~oyrnent.If higher ru-
ral wage rates are sustained, one would expect an
increase in off-farm labor market participation. To
the extent that this increased participation moves
the composition of family income toward the pat-
tern exhibited in our subsample, the longer term
effect on inequality may lie somewhere between10 April 1990 NJARE
the statewide elasticities and the one for the sub-
sample which is more than two times as large,
Summary and Conclusions
As the proportion of farm family income due to
nonfarm sources continues to grow nationally, it
is also important to understand how farm families
in various regions or states are affected. The pur-
pose of this paper is to develop a better understand-
ing of the contribution of income from nonfarm
sourcesto the level and distributionof incomeamong
farm families in New York. Data used in the anal-
ysis were for 1985 and 1986, the first two years
for which nonfarrn income was collected as part
of the Cornell farm records project,
In analyzing the distribution of income, recent
developments in the decomposition of the Gini ra-
tio are used to determine the effects of marginal
changes in income by source to overall inequality,
However, before attempting any policy analysis, a
methodological issue surrounding the treatment of
negative annual farm and family incomes due to
the current financial crisis in today’s agriculture
was examined. As it turns out, the data used in the
study were quite appropriate for resolving this issue
in that 1986 was a much better year for New York
agriculture than was 1985; thus, the incidence and
severity of negative farm incomes were quite dif-
ferent for each of the years,
On the basis of this examination, there seemed
to be little justification for setting negative incomes
to zero and completing the analysis in terms of the
conventional Gini and its analytical decomposition.
Furthermore, when there is a substantial incidence
of negative incomes, the conventional Gini ratios
can seriously overstate inequality and the elastic-
ities of income inequality may be affected. Thus,
in making comparisons of inequality and in ex-
amining the effects of policy changes on income
inequality, it is advisable to calculate the “ad-
justed” Gini to simulate the elasticities of inequal-
ity by source based on this “adjusted” measure of
inequality. In saying this, however, it is important
to remember that the three components (S, R, and
G from equation (4)) remain valid statistics in their
own right and help focus on the nature of the in-
terrelationships among sources of income.
Using both these measures of inequality, this
analysis clearly demonstrates that income from
nonfarm sources contributes to the size of New
York farm family incomes, but to a lesser degree
than for the nation as a whole. This is not surprising
given the predominance of labor-intensive dairy
farming in the state, although the importance of
nonfarm incomes would have been more important
had the sample included more small or part-time
farmers. Nonfarm sources of income are also larger
on average than direct government payments be-
cause dairy farmers are not major participants in
feed-grain and other agricultural programs where
direct government payments are made. The situa-
tion would be different if it were possible to sep-
arate from farm income the indirect payments
associated with dairy price supports.
In terms of the distribution of income, it is shown
that agricultural or other general economic policies
that increase net farm income will exacerbate in-
come inequality among farm families, The most
pronounced effect would be felt through a change
in the price of milk at the farm level, followed by
changes in support programs for crops that would
ultimately be reflected in feed costs. However, quite
the opposite is true if family incomes are improved
by increasing income from nonfarm sources. Rural
development efforts to promote greater off-farm
job opportunities or increase rural nonfarm wage
levelswill likelyteduce the incomeinequalityamong
farm families, In New York, these opportunities
will be even more critical in the future as the dairy
industry contracts and rural economies try to absorb
surplus labor in the face of new technology and a
gradual decline in the dairy support levels.
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